Aerospace Software: AI Must Produce Evidence, Not Just Output
For flight-critical software, the test for AI development tools is whether their output survives as certifiable evidence, not how fast it was produced.
For flight-critical software, the test for AI development tools is whether their output survives as certifiable evidence, not how fast it was produced.
As AI-driven sensor fusion becomes the answer to GNSS jamming and spoofing, aviation certification lacks a framework for proving adversarial robustness.
AI surrogate models are replacing validated engineering and lab tools faster than ISO 42001, the EU AI Act, and FDA regimes can absorb them.
MRO, cockpit, and airspace AI are advancing across aviation while the FAA still lacks a settled safety assurance method, raising airworthiness and liability exposure.
Aerospace certification data from Farnborough exposes a wider governance problem: many AI autonomy and risk-detection claims have no equivalent conformity regime at all.
Edge AI models shrunk by 99% for aerospace and defense inference lack a certification pathway to treat compression as a qualifiable design change.
Fresh SBIR funding for real-time model health monitoring shows explainable AI assurance in defense aerospace remains pre-competitive research, not a purchasable safeguard.
Aerospace AI assurance cases assume clean navigation data, but PNT signals are now contested terrain that most safety cases never model.